

Imagined futures gone astray. A praxio-onto-epistemological analysis

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Contents

1 Systems science

2 Implications

2.1 Praxiological implications: technologies


2.2 Ontological implications: theories

2.3 Epistemological implications: methods

3 Conclusion

1 Systems science

- Praxio-
onto-
epistemology



2.1 Praxiological implications: technologies

| | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|--|---|
| | | „man-machine“ designs | |
| technomorphism | | the human shall be improved by artificial design only | |
| sociomorphism | | the artificial shall be improved by human-like design only | |
| hetero- morph- ism | socio- genic | the human and the artificial shall be treated as independent ends in themselves | the human shall be improved by pure human (social) design |
| | techno- genic | | the artificial shall be improved by pure artificial design |
| | inter- active | | the human and the artificial shall be treated in a pure network-design |
| technosocial systemism | | the artificial shall be designed to mediate social system functions for the flourishing of human actors | |

2.2 Ontological implications: theories

| | | „man-machine“ models | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|--|--|
| technomorphism | | any man/society is a mechanism (reductive monism) | |
| sociomorphism | | any mechanism is human/social (projective monism) | |
| hetero- morph- ism | socio- genic | man/society and mechanisms are different entities | man/society is essentially different from a mechanism (disjunctive monism) |
| | techno- genic | | a mechanism is essentially different from man/society (disjunctive monism) |
| | inter- active | | man/society and mechanisms differ essentially but can interact (dualism) |
| technosocial systemism | | man/society and mechanisms form technosocial systems that functionalise mechanisms (dialectic) | |

2.3 Epistemological implications: methods

| | | „man-machine“ frames | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|---|--|
| technomorphism | | mechanical frames suffice for social data (monodisciplinarity) | |
| sociomorphism | | social frames suffice for mechanical data (monodisciplinarity) | |
| hetero- morph- ism | socio- genic | social data and mechanical data need independent frames (multi- disciplinarity) | social data needs pure social frames (monodisciplinarity) |
| | techno- genic | | mechanical data needs pure mechanical frames (monodisciplinarity) |
| | inter- active | | social data and mechanical data need an interactive frame (interdisciplinarity) |
| technosocial systemism | | social data, mechanical data and data of their interaction need an integrated technosocial frame (transdisciplinarity) | |

3 Conclusion (1)

trans-/post human singularitarianism:

- „human bodies shall be engineered“:

technomorphism: triple reduction of

- a) the social to the individual (individualism),
- b) the individual to the biological (biologism),
- b) the body to a machine (mechanicism)

- „artificial creations will outperform human beings“:

sociogenic heteromorphism turned technogenic: double disjunction of

- a) man from machine: human exceptionalism – hubris,
- b) machine from man: machine exceptionalism – hubristic self-humiliation („Promethean shame“ – Günther Anders 1956)

3 Conclusion (2)

what is needed instead:

- a transcendence not of individual bodies but a systems transformation that achieves the transition to a **third step in anthroposociogenesis**: the extension of co-operative social relations to the global level